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FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP FORMATION:
DUELING DICTA
MITCHELL M. GANS AND JONATHAN G. BLATTMACHR*

INTRODUCTION

In attempting to limit the use of family limited partnerships as a
transfer-tax strategy, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has advanced
several arguments.' The courts, however, have not been entirely receptive.
For example, the IRS has not had any success with the argument that a
partnership formed without a sufficient business purpose must
automatically be disregarded for transfer-tax purposes. 2 As a result,
partnerships formed for tax-driven reasons remain a viable estate-planning
strategy. Nonetheless, the IRS has enjoyed some important successes with
two arguments.
The first argument, a gift-tax argument, stems from the indirect gift
regulation. 3 Under the regulation, the contribution of an asset to an entity
is treated as an indirect gift of the asset to those who own an interest in the
Copyright © 2006 Mitchell M. Gans and Jonathan G. Blattmachr.
All rights reserved. Mitchell M. Gans is a Professor of Law at Hofstra University
School of Law in Hempstead, N.Y. He is an ACTEC Academic Fellow. Jonathan G.
Blattmachr is a partner in Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, LLP, in New York City. He
is an ACTEC Fellow. The authors recently co-authored, along with Damien Rios, THE
CIRCULAR 230 DESKBOOK (PLI 2006).

1 For example, in Estate ofStrangi v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 478 (2000), aff d in part,
rev'd in part, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002), the IRS argued that the family limited
partnership should be disregarded on the ground that the decedent did not have a business
purpose for creating it, id. at 484; that the same result should be obtained under I.R.C.
section 2703 or section 2036, id. at 487; and that a taxable gift occurred in connection with
the partnership's formation, id at 489. In Hackl v. Commissioner, 335 F.3d 664, 667 (7th
Cir. 2003), the IRS successfully denied the annual exclusion for the gift of an interest in a
limited liability company (LLC) because of restrictions on transferability. Finally, in Smith
v. United States, No. 02-264, 2005 WL 3021918, at *2, *5 (W.D. Pa. July 22, 2005), the
IRS successfully invoked section 2703 to deny an enhanced marketability discount claim
for a right of first refusal with respect to the partnership unit that was the subject of a gift.
2 See Estate of Strangi, 115 T.C. at 486-87; see also Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 506,
513-14 (2000). But see Estate of Bongard v. Comm'r, 124 T.C. 95, 126 n.l 1 (2005)
(noting that the IRS had not argued that the partnership should be disregarded under
sections 7701 or 701).
3 See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 (2006).
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entity. 4 When the regulation applies, the value of the gift is determined on
an "undiscounted" basis: the
existence of the entity is disregarded for
5
purposes of valuing the gift.
The second argument, an estate-tax argument, derives from I.R.C.
section 2036.6 Under section 2036, if the decedent retains access to or
control over the assets contributed to the partnership, the entity may be
disregarded for estate tax purposes.7 This argument, however, is subject to
a critical exception: if the estate can demonstrate that the decedent had a
sufficient non-tax purpose for forming the entity, then the entity is not
disregarded, despite the decedent's retention of access or control (provided
the decedent had received full consideration in contributing the assets to
the entity). 8
Even though taxpayers may be able to defeat both of these arguments
with careful planning, 9 the section 2036 argument presents planners with a
4 See id.
5 See Senda v. Comm'r, 433 F.3d 1044, 1046 (8th Cir. 2006) ("[T]ransfers of property

by gift, by whatever means effected [either direct or indirect], are subject to the federal gift
tax." These gifts should be valued at "full undiscounted value.").
6 I.R.C. § 2036 (2000).
7 See Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331,

1336, 1344-45 (2003),

aff'd, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005) (invoking section 2036 to foreclose discount on the
ground that the decedent retained an interest in the assets contributed to the partnership);
see also Mitchell M. Gans & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Strangi: A Critical Analysis and
Planning Suggestions, 100 TAX NOTES 1153, 1154 (2003) (explaining that, in Strangi,
because the Tax Court found that section 2036 applied, the partnership form was ignored,
and no discount based on the existence of the partnership was permitted for estate tax
purposes).
8 See, e.g., Estate of Rosen v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1220, 1231-32 (2006); Estate
of Abraham v. Comm'r, 408 F.3d 26, 37 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2351
(2006); Estate of Bigelow v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 954, 960 (2005); Estate of

Bongard v. Comm'r, 124 T.C. 95, 113-15 (2005); Estate of Korby v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1142, 1148 (2005); Estate of Schutt v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1353, 1364
(2005); Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 417 F.3d 468, 478-80 (5th Cir. 2005); Estate of
Thompson v. Comm'r, 382 F.3d 367, 378 (3d Cir. 2004).
9 For example, as we have previously suggested, it may be possible to defeat section
2036 by adopting a structure that leaves the transferor with no interest in the partnership.
See Gans & Blattmachr, supra note 7. To illustrate, assume a husband forms a limited
partnership to which he makes an insubstantial contribution for the limited partnership
interests; he might own the general partnership interest through an LLC that he owns and
the limited partnership units directly. If his wife were to contribute her assets to the
partnership as a gift and not receive an interest in the partnership in exchange, then section
(continued)
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more difficult challenge and, therefore, is the more potent of the two.
Indeed, taxpayers aware of the indirect-gift argument may easily defeat it,
even though the Eighth Circuit's recent decision in Senda v. Commissioner
strengthened the argument. Because we have previously written about the
section 2036 argument, ° this Article focuses on the indirect-gift
argument-specifically, how Senda has reshaped it, and how taxpayers
may alter the entity-formation process to defeat it.
Until the Eighth Circuit's recent decision in Senda, the IRS had not
been very successful in the courts with its gift-tax approach to family
limited partnerships." Even though the IRS prevailed in the Eleventh

2036 would not apply to her estate at her later death because she did not retain access or
control with regard to the partnership's assets. See id. Nor could section 2036 apply to the
husband's estate (except for his insubstantial contribution to the partnership) because he
was not the transferor within the meaning of section 2036 with respect to the partnership's
assets. In other words, section 2036 cannot apply unless the person making the transfer
retains access or control. See Mitchell M. Gans, Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Stephanie E.
Heilborn, Some Good News About Grantor Trusts: Rev. Rul. 2004-64, EST. PLAN., Oct.
2004, at 467, 474; cf Estate of Gutchess v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 554, 556-57 (1966)
(indicating that section 2036 may not apply where a spouse transfers the home to the other
spouse and is allowed to continue residing in it). But see Estate of McCabe v. United
States, 475 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (applying section 2036 to the grantor of a
trust, even though he was not a beneficiary, where he in fact received distributions with the
consent of his wife, the beneficiary). Finally, because of the marital deduction, the wife's
gift to the partnership would not result in a taxable gift. See Rev. Rul. 71-443, 1971-2 C.B.
338, 338. For further discussion of this arrangement, see Gans & Blattmachr, supra note 7,
at 1167.
10See Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and Family Limited Partnerships:A Case Study, in
39 ANN. HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. 5-1, 5-8 to -9, 5-20 to -22 (Tina Portuondo ed.,

2005). See generally Gans & Blattmachr, supra note 7.
11See, e.g., Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 478, 486-87 (2000), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting the IRS's gift-on-formation
argument); Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 506, 513-14 (2000). This is to be contrasted with
the IRS's many successes in applying section 2036 in the family limited partnership
context. See, e.g., Estate of Abraham, 408 F.3d at 37-39; Estate of Bongard, 124 T.C. at
131; Estate of Strangi, 417 F.3d at 478; Estate of Thompson, 382 F.3d at 376. It is also to
be contrasted with the IRS's success in invoking 26 U.S.C. § 2703 to limit the amount of
marketability discount claimed in connection with the gift of an interest in a family entity.
See Smith v. United States, No. 02-264, 2005 WL 3021918, at *2, *5-6 (W.D. Pa. July 22,
2005). But cf Hackl v. Comm'r, 335 F.3d 664, 667-68 (7th Cir. 2003) (denying the annual
exclusion for the gift of an interest in an LLC because of restrictions on transferability).
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Circuit in Shepherd v. Commissioner'2 and in the Tax Court in Senda,13
taxpayers could easily navigate these IRS victories through proper
planning.14 Dicta in the Eighth Circuit's decision in Senda, which
ironically conflicts with dicta in the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Shepherd,1 5 has added a new wrinkle that will force taxpayers to rethink
the partnership-formation process.
The Senda dicta may make the
formation process somewhat more complicated, but it likely will not make
the IRS's gift-tax arguments any more effective against savvy taxpayers.
IRS's GIFT-TAX ARGUMENTS
The IRS's gift-tax approach with respect to family limited partnerships
has had two strands: a gift-on-formation argument and an indirect-gift
argument. Under the gift-on-formation theory, the IRS claims that when a
contribution of assets is made to a limited partnership in exchange for a
limited unit, the person making the contribution depletes his estate by an
amount equal to the discount inherent in the limited partnership unit
received in the exchange; the taxable gift is equal to the amount of the
depletion.1 6 To illustrate, if a taxpayer contributes $10,000,000 to a
partnership and, in return, receives a limited partnership interest having a
lesser value of, say, $7,000,000 because of lack of control, lack of
marketability, or other discounts, a taxable7 gift of $3,000,000 is deemed to
occur under the gift-on-formation theory.
2 See 115 T.C. 376, 389 (2000), aff'd, 283 F.3d 1258 (11 th Cir. 2002).
3 See 88 T.CM. (CCH) 8, 11-12,
14 See, e.g., Wendy C. Gerzog,

aff'd, 433 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 2006).
Return to Senda: Order Determinative for FLP

Discounts, 110 TAx NOTES 791 (2006).
15See Shepherd v. Comm'r, 283 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir. 2002).
16 For

a discussion of the origin of I.R.S. Tec. Adv. Mem, 98-42-003 (July 2, 1998),

where the IRS first articulated this theory, see Leo L. Schmolka, FLPs and GRATs: What
To Do?, 86 TAx NOTES 1473 (2000). See also Laura E. Cunningham, Remember the
Alamo: The IRS Needs Ammunition in its Fight Against the FLP, 86 TAx NOTES 1461,
1468-69 (2000). The theory could also apply to the formation of a limited liability
company. Id at 1468.
17See Cunningham, supra note 16, at 1469.
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Originally conceived in the corporate context,' 8 the gift-on-formation
theory has not fared well in the partnership setting. The Tax Court, 9 the
Fifth Circuit, 20 and the Third Circuit 2 l (in dicta) have rejected it. On the
rationale that a shift in wealth does not occur where a taxpayer makes a
contribution to a partnership that is credited to her own capital account, the
courts have thus far uniformly refused to apply the theory in the case of a
partnership. 22 Aware of this developing consensus in the courts, many
18

Courts have held that where a contribution is made to a corporation in exchange for

preferred stock or non-voting common stock, a taxable gift is made to the extent the value
of the stock received is less than the value of the asset contributed. E.g., Kincaid v. United
States, 682 F.2d 1220, 1224 (5th Cir. 1982); Estate of Bosca v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH)
62, 69 (1998); Estate of Trenchard v. Comm'r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2732, 2733 (1995); Lewis
G. Hutchens Non-Marital Trust v. Comm'r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1599, 1611 (1993).
19 See Estate of Jones v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 121, 128 (2001); Estate of Strangi v.
Comm'r, 115 T.C. 478, 489-90 (2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir.
2002); Knight v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 506, 514 (2000).
20See Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 2002).
21See Estate of Thompson v. Comm'r, 382 F.3d 367, 385 (3d Cir. 2004) (intimating in
a two-judge concurring opinion that no taxable gift occurs on account of such depletion).
22 In the corporate context, a contribution to the corporation in exchange for voting
common stock appears not to trigger a taxable gift merely because the value of the stock
received in the exchange is, by reason of marketability or minority discount, less than the
value of the contributed asset. In Kincaid,682 F.2d 1220, the government tacitly conceded
this point-it chose not to assert a gift tax deficiency on account of the discount inherent in
the common stock. In Shepherd v. Commissioner, the Tax Court, citing its earlier decision
in Gross v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 837 (1946), suggested that in the case of a general
partnership a contribution should not result in a taxable gift if it is credited to the capital
account of the person making the contribution. 155 T.C. 376, 389 (2000). This is
somewhat similar to the government's approach in Kincaid: no gift on a contribution in
exchange for an interest in an entity carrying a reduced value by reason of discount. 682
F.2d at 1226. In Strangi, the court extended this approach to limited partnerships. 115 T.C.
at 490. Thus, under Strangi, a taxpayer who makes a contribution of an asset to a limited
partnership in exchange for a limited unit is not treated as having made a taxable gift,
because the discounted value of the unit is worth less than the value of the contributed asset,
as long as the contribution is credited to the taxpayer's capital account and it does not
enhance the interest of any other partner. See id. Although the Strangi court also
emphasized the fact that the taxpayer had owned (directly or indirectly) approximately
95.5% of the partnership units and that there was therefore no meaningful donee, id. at 486,
the Tax Court has invoked Strangi to reject a gift-on-formation argument even where others
held a meaningful interest in the partnership. See Estate of Jones, 116 T.C. at 128. It is
noteworthy, however, that in Jones the parent had the ability to force liquidation of the
partnership immediately after its formation. Id at 135. Although the court did not allude to
(continued)
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practitioners have concluded that there is little, if any, need for continuing
concern about the gift-on-formation theory in connection with partnership
formation.23
A. Indirect-GiftArgument
Courts, however, have been receptive to the indirect-gift theory.2 4 In
Shepherd, the parent contributed assets to the family partnership. 25 Half of
the contribution was credited to the children's capital accounts.26 Invoking
Treasury Regulation section 25.251 1-l(h)(1) (the indirect gift regulation),2 7
the IRS maintained that the parent made an indirect gift in the amount
credited to the children's capital accounts.28 In other words, based on the
regulation, the parent is treated as if he made the gift directly to the
children, effectively ignoring the existence of the partnership for gift tax
purposes.29 The Tax Court embraced the argument,3 ° and the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed. 3' Ominously for the IRS, both the Tax Court and the
Eleventh Circuit suggested in dicta that the result would have been
different (i.e., a partnership-level discount would have been allowed) had
the contribution been credited to the parent's capital account before the gift
of the partnership interest to the33 children was made.32 The dissenting
opinion also endorsed this notion.
this fact in rejecting the IRS's gift-on-formation argument, see id at 128, Jones could
arguably be distinguished if the parent failed to retain such a liquidation right. Thus, a

conservative taxpayer might want to adopt an arrangement that permits him to force
liquidation immediately after formation.
See Gans, supra note 10, at 5-9 ("[W]ell advised taxpayers ought to be able to avoid
the IRS's gift-on-formation argument through the simple expedient of proper maintenance
23

of the capital accounts.").
24 See,
25

e.g., Shepherd, 115 T.C. at 389.

1Id. at 381.

21

See id at 380.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 384.

29

Treasury Regulation section 25.2511-1(h)(1) (2006) provides that in the case of a

26

27

contribution to a corporation, the contribution is treated as a gift made to the other
shareholders, and thus the existence of the corporation is ignored for gift tax purposes. In
Shepherd, this pierce-the-entity's-veil concept was applied to a partnership. See Shepherd,
115 T.C. at 388; see also Shepherd, 283 F.3d 1258 (2002).
30

See Shepherd, 115 T.C. at 389.

31 Shepherd, 283 F.3d at 1264.
32

31

See Shepherd, 115 T.C. at 385; Shepherd, 283 F.3d at 1261.
Shepherd, 283 F.3d at 1266 (Ryskamp, J., dissenting).
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The Shepherd dicta threatened to undermine significantly the value of
the court's holding to the IRS. If, for example, the documentation
established that the contribution to the partnership occurred days or
perhaps hours before the gift of limited units, then discount would
presumably be permitted, according to the dicta.34 As a result, Shepherd
quickly came to be seen as a somewhat aberrational case in which a
planning failure resulted in the taxpayer's defeat. Had the contribution to
the partnership occurred immediately before the gift of the limited units,
instead of immediately after the gift, the taxpayer would have prevailed.35
Shepherd was thus perceived as nothing more than a cautionary tale about
the need to sequence and document the contribution and gift properly.
This perception of Shepherd was borne out in Estate of Jones v.
Commissioner.36 In Jones, the father made a contribution to a limited
partnership in exchange for limited partnership units.37 Even though he
made a gift of his limited units to his children immediately after
contributing to the partnership, 38 the court upheld the discount and rejected
the IRS's indirect-gift argument as well as its gift-on-formation
argument. 39 The court distinguished Shepherd, emphasizing that, unlike
Shepherd, the contribution had been credited to the father's capital
account.40 Jones in effect expanded the Shepherd dicta into a holding:
proper sequencing (even if the parent makes the gift of the partnership
interest immediately after the contribution to the partnership) precludes the
IRS from invoking the indirect-gift argument as long as the partnership
41
first credits the contribution to the contributing partner's capital account.
34

See id at 1261 (majority opinion).

35 See id

Even the IRS agreed that discount would have been appropriate had the gift
of the partnership interest followed the contribution of assets to the partnership. See id. at
1266 (Ryskamp, J., dissenting) ("The parties agree that if Mr. Shepherd... conveyed the
property to the partnership.... and then gave his partnership interest to his sons ... , the
sons would receive gifts ... , the valuation of which would take into account the...
partnership." (emphasis added)).
36
See 116 T.C. 121, 128 (2001).
37
1d. at 124.
38

id.

39 See id. at 128. The Court did not consider the IRS's gift-on-formation argument. Id.
40

Id. The court did not elaborate as to the circumstances in which such an enhancement

in value might be deemed to occur. See id. Presumably, if a contribution were reflected in
the parent's capital account but the income it generated were to be reflected in the
children's capital accounts, the court would find a gift-taxable enhancement.
41 See id.
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B. The Indirect-GiftArgument and the Eighth Circuit'sDicta in Senda
In Senda, the Tax Court left intact this understanding of the Shepherd
dicta and the decision in Jones.42 In Senda, as in Jones, the contribution of
assets to the partnership and the gift of limited units to the children
occurred at approximately the same time. 43 The taxpayer relied on Jones,
claiming that the contribution was properly reflected in his capital account,
and therefore, the gift of the limited units should qualify for a discount.44
The Tax Court, however, distinguished Jones and applied Shepherd,45
denying a discount in computing the value of the gifted limited units.46
According to the court, unlike Jones, Senda involved a sequencing failure:
the taxpayer failed to prove that the contribution had been made to the
partnership before the gift of the limited units.47 In such circumstances, the
gift and contribution "were integrated ...and, in effect, simultaneous. 4 8
The taxpayer, in other words, could not establish, as the Shepherd dicta
required, that the contribution had preceded the gift.
The court also found that the taxpayer failed to prove that his
contribution was properly credited to his capital account.49
The
implication is that, had the taxpayer carried his burden of proof on this
factual issue, the court would have permitted a discount, despite the
sequencing failure. 50 The implication is consistent with the notion in
Shepherd that a contribution of assets that is credited to the contributing
partner's capital account cannot be viewed as a gift of those assets.
On the taxpayer's appeal in Senda, the IRS sought to undo the
Shepherd dicta, the Jones holding, and the Senda implication.51 In its
Eighth Circuit brief, the IRS made two critical arguments. First, it argued
52
that the Shepherd dicta was just that-dicta-and should not be followed.
Second, it argued that the step-transaction doctrine was neither raised nor
42See 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 8, 11 (2004), aff'd, 433 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 2006).
43Id.

44See

id.

45 id.
46

See id. at 12.

41See id. at 11.
48

Id.

49 Id.

'oSee id.

51See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
52See Brief for the Appellee 28-29, Senda v. Comm'r, 433 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 2006)
05-1118), available at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/briefs/05/05/appellee/

(No.

051118_1 br.pdf'?A =View+Brief.
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considered by the court in Jones.53 Focusing on the word "integrated" in
the Tax Court opinion in Senda, the IRS argued that, unlike the decision in
Jones, the Senda decision had applied the step-transaction doctrine, 54 In
short, the IRS did not merely seek an affirmance in the Eighth Circuit on
the narrow, factual ground that the taxpayer failed to establish the
sequencing necessary to invoke the Shepherd dicta. It rather sought to
negate the Shepherd dicta through application of the step-transaction
doctrine.55
The IRS found a receptive audience in the Eighth Circuit. After
affirming on the failure-of-proof ground, finding no clear error after
evaluating the evidence on the sequencing issue, the court went on to read
the Tax Court as adopting a view that is inconsistent with the Shepherd
dicta and the Jones holding. 56 In a critical sentence, the Eighth Circuit
stated: "The tax court recognizes that even if the Sendas' contribution
would have first been credited to their accounts, this formal extra step does
not matter., 57 Thus, as the Eighth Circuit appears to read the Tax Court
decision, even if the contribution and the gift had been properly sequenced,
the indirect-gift doctrine would still produce a taxable gift if the timing of
the contribution and gift were such that they could be integrated under the
step-transaction doctrine.58 Surprisingly, the court did not acknowledge
59
the contrary dicta in Shepherd or the holding in Jones.
What is even more interesting is that the court posits a counterfactual
hypothetical-contribution followed by gift-not discussed in the Tax
60
Court opinion, and then wrongly reads the opinion as having addressed it.
The Tax Court in Senda was at pains to emphasize the difference between
Senda and Jones: whereas in Jones the taxpayer proved that the
contribution had occurred prior to the gift and that it had been properly
" Id. at 29.
54Id.at 29-30.
" Id. at 30. In Knight v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 506 (2000), on facts somewhat
similar to those in Jones, the court explicitly indicated that the IRS had not made the
indirect-gift argument. Id.at 513 n.3. Although Jones does not include a similar indication
and does not cite Knight, see Estate of Jones v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 121 (2001), one might
infer that the Tax Court did not want to foreclose the IRS from using the step-transaction
doctrine to make an indirect-gift argument.
56 Senda v. Comm'r, 433 F.3d 1044, 1048 (8th Cir. 2006).
57
id
51See id
69 See id.

"0See id.
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credited to his capital account, the taxpayer's evidence in Senda
established either that the contribution and gift had occurred
simultaneously or that the contribution was made after the gift; it also
failed to establish that the contribution had been credited to the taxpayer's
capital account. 61 In thus distinguishing Jones, the Tax Court in Senda did
not find that the contribution followed the gift and therefore did not
consider the consequences of such sequencing.62
Given the fact that the opinions in Senda and Jones were written by the
same Tax Court judge (Judge Cohen) 63 and given the way in which the
decision in Senda is narrowly tailored so as not to call into question the
holding in Jones or the Shepherd dicta, 64 it seems implausible that the
author of the Senda opinion in the Tax Court was prepared to embrace the
resolution proffered by the Eighth Circuit for the counterfactual it posits.
Most ironically, the Eighth Circuit's implicit rejection of the Shepherd
dicta is itself dicta,6 5 thus creating a conflict in dicta between the circuits
(as well as a conflict between the Eighth Circuit's dicta and the holding in
Jones).6 6
This is not to suggest that the Eighth Circuit's dicta should be rejected
in favor of the Shepherd dicta. Indeed, resulting from an IRS concession,
the Shepherd dicta failed to distinguish between two very different cases:
where the gift of the partnership interest is made long after the donor's
contribution to the partnership, on the one hand, and where the gift is made
immediately following the contribution, on the other. 67 Whereas in the
former case the no-indirect-gift conclusion under the dicta does make
sense, there is little justification for extending the same treatment to the
latter case. The step-transaction doctrine should, in other words, be
available to the IRS where the contribution and the gift can be viewed as
constituting part of the same transaction. Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit
erred in attributing its dicta to the Tax Court. It also seemingly fails to
appreciate the tension it has created between the Shepherd dicta and the
Jones holding.

61See Senda v. Comm'r, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 8, 11 (2004), aff'd, 433 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir.

2006).
62
See id. at 11-12.
63
Id. at 8; Estate of Jones, 116 T.C. at 122.
64 See Senda, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) at 11.
65 See Senda v. Comm'r, 433 F.3d 1044, 1048 (8th Cir. 2006).
66
67

See Estate of Jones, 116 T.C. at 128.
See id.
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Given the IRS's Eighth Circuit brief in Senda,68 the IRS will likely
argue that the Senda dicta does not create such a conflict. The IRS will
presumably maintain that the Shepherd dicta and the Jones holding remain
intact, but they will now be subject to an exception when the IRS can
successfully assert the step-transaction doctrine. Thus, whenever the
contribution and gift occur within a narrow time frame, the IRS will
presumably claim that the two steps should be integrated in order to trigger
the indirect-gift doctrine. And, most significantly, given the Senda dicta,
the IRS will undoubtedly take this position
even if the evidence establishes
69
that the contribution preceded the gift.
It should be conceded that it is possible to read the Senda dicta
differently. It may be read as speaking not at all to the question of
sequencing. It may instead be read as contemplating a taxpayer who: (1)
first makes a gift of the limited units to the children; (2) then makes an
additional contribution that is first credited to the taxpayer's capital
account; and (3) then immediately causes the contribution to be re-credited
to the children's capital account as a gift. 70 In other words, perhaps the
sentence was intended to do no more than permit the IRS to treat such a
taxpayer as if the contribution had been directly credited to the children's
capital account in the first instance. Indeed, this would be consistent with
the approach the IRS took in a 2001 Technical Advice Memorandum:
discount should not be allowed in the context of similar facts based on an
application of the step-transaction doctrine. 7' But such a reading also
raises questions, because the Tax Court decision cannot be read as
applying the step-transaction doctrine in this fashion.72 To the contrary,
the Tax Court found that the taxpayer failed to prove that the contribution
had been credited to his capital account, implying that the taxpayer would
have come within the Jones holding and thus prevailed had he carried his
burden of proof on the issue. 73
C. Planningin Light of Senda
In terms of planning, it is no longer prudent for taxpayers to rely on the
holding in Jones and the Shepherd dicta. The Senda dicta suggests the
68 See Brief for the Appellee, supra note 52, at 29-30.
69 See Senda, 433 F.3d at 1048.
70 See id.
71 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mer. 02-12-006 (Nov. 20, 2001).
72

See Senda v. Cornm'r, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 8, 11 (2002), aff'd, 433 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir.

2006).
73 See Senda, 433 F.3d at 1048.
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need to rethink the formation process. Whereas under Jones a parent could
make a contribution in exchange for limited units and then, immediately
afterward, make a gift of the limited units without falling under the
indirect-gift doctrine, 74 this may no longer be true under the Senda dicta.
Thus, taxpayers using the Jones template may need to allow sufficient time
to elapse between the contribution and the later gift in order to minimize
the threat of the step-transaction doctrine.
Other strategies may also be effective. For example, if the parent's
contribution is credited to her capital account and she retains all of the
partnership units that she receives in exchange, the indirect-gift argument
cannot be made. 75 It can only apply if the contribution is credited to the
children's capital accounts 76 or if the IRS can invoke the Senda dicta by
integrating the contribution and the gift. 77 In other words, if the
contribution is credited to the parent's capital account and no gift of
partnership units is made, the indirect-gift argument cannot be applied,
despite the Senda dicta. 78 Thus, the formation of the partnership would not
result in a taxable gift, even though discount would be available for estate
tax purposes at the parent's later death with respect to all retained
partnership units (assuming section 2036 does not apply).
Alternatively, the parent's gift of, say, a one percent general
partnership interest shortly after formation should limit the parent's
exposure to the indirect-gift argument. 79 And, assuming again that section
2036 does not apply, estate-tax discount should be available for the
retained units (though such a gift could possibly trigger estate-tax inclusion
under section 2035(b) if death were to occur within three years 80 and if the
section 2036(a)(2) argument endorsed by the Tax Court in Strangi v.

74 See Estate of Jones v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 121, 124, 128 (2001).
75
76

See id. at 128.
See Shepherd v. Comm'r, 155 T.C. 376, 389 (2000), aff'd, 283 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir.

2002).
77 See Senda, 433 F.3d at 1048.
78

See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.

79 The amount of the taxable gift would be equal to the undiscounted value of one

percent of the partnership's assets. See Senda, 433 F.3d at 1046. Thus, as long as the postformation gift is not substantial, Senda does not pose a very serious threat as a practical
matter.
" See I.R.C. § 2035(b) (2000).
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Commissioner were followed).8' In short, given the Senda dicta, careful
taxpayers will likely no longer use the Jones template.
D. Gift-Tax Arguments: PracticalSignificance
What, then, is the practical significance of Senda and, more generally,
of the IRS's gift-tax arguments? In terms of the gift-on-formation
argument, as suggested, the courts have been unreceptive. 2 But, even
assuming they were to take a different view of the argument, it would
nonetheless be rather ineffective. Planners would likely recommend that
the parent own all units in the partnership immediately following the
contribution (for example, the parent might own the general partner units
through a single-member LLC and might directly own all of the limited
units). Under this structure, even assuming the courts were willing to
apply the gift-on-formation theory, no gift could occur in connection with
the formation because the parent is the only partner and there is therefore
no donee. 83 And if, after waiting a significant period of time, the parent
were to make a gift of partnership units, discount would be available in
valuing the gift-at least under present law.84 Thus, absent a change in the
81 See

Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1331, 1341-42 (2003), aff'd on

other grounds, 417 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2005) (stating that if the parent retains a general
partnership interest, then a right to vote concerning liquidation of the partnership that is
inherent in the interest could trigger estate-tax inclusion, even assuming the parent does not
have sufficient voting power to trigger liquidation unilaterally). For a further discussion of
the section 2036(a)(2) analysis made by the court in Strangi, see generally Gans &
Blattmachr, supra note 7. For suggestions on how to structure a partnership so that a parent
who owns a general partnership interest does not have any voting rights (to avoid falling
under section 2035 via section 2036(a)(2)), see id. at 1164-69 (suggesting that the parent
own the general partnership interest through an LLC with someone other than the parentmanager having all of the voting rights).
82 See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
83 See Cunningham, supra note 16, at 1469 ("[T]he argument could be avoided
altogether if taxpayers form single-member LLCs, because of the impossibility of making a
gift to oneself. The Service would need to rely on some other theory to deny discounts on
subsequent transfers of interests in the entity."); cf Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 115 T.C.
478, 490 (2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 293 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002) (indicating that
the parent owned practically all of the interests in the partnership, implying there was no
meaningful donee).
84 If, for example, the parent made a later gift of the general partnership interest, it
would be valued under conventional principles: based on the price that a third party would
pay for the interest without taking into account the fact that the parent's retained limited
units would have a lesser value once no longer held in conjunction with the general
(continued)
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regulations or the Code, 85 planners could easily defeat the gift-onformation argument, even if it were accepted by the courts, by adjusting
the steps in the partnership-formation process.
Finally, as indicated, unlike the gift-on-formation argument, the
indirect-gift argument has produced success for the IRS-in Shepherd86
and Senda.87

But, most importantly, it can only be effective if the

taxpayer, as in Shepherd or Senda, fails to structure the formation process
properly. 88 For taxpayers, however, who follow one of the suggested
approaches, 89 the argument will be entirely ineffective. In sum, the
indirect-gift argument, even in its more robust Senda-dicta version, is
nothing more than a trap for the unwary.

partnership interest. See Cunningham, supra note 16, at 1469; Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1
C.B. 202, 203. If, however, under state law or under the agreement, the donee became an
assignee, rather than a full partner, section 2704(a) could apply and could treat the
diminution in value of the retained limited units as a taxable gift. See Cunningham, supra
note 16, at 1468. Thus, careful planners would make certain that full-partner status was
conferred on the donee. See Estate of Jones v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 121, 132 (2001)
(concluding that, by reason of the structure of the gift, the donee became a full partner
rather than an assignee); Kerr v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 449, 464 (1999). But see McCord v.
Comm'r, 120 T.C. 358, 370-73 (2003). For further discussion of this problematic aspect of
section 2704 and how it might be cured, see Schmolka, supra note 16, at 1487-89.
85 See Gans, supra note 10, at 5-14 to -22 (suggesting regulations that
would address
these issues).
86 See 115 T.C. 376, 389 (2000), aff'd, 283 F.3d 1258 (1 th Cir. 2002).
87 See 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 8, 11-12, aff'd, 433 F.3d 1044 (6th Cir. 2006).
88 See Shepherd, 283 F.3d at 1261; Senda, 433 F.3d at 1048.
89 See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.

